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Abstract This article uses data from recent interviews with chief police officers in England and Wales to assess the
connections between how chief police officers are overseen and given political direction and police legitimacy. The
research found that governance changes started in 2011, particularly the election of police and crime commissioners,
led to chief officers feeling more anxious, and the reforms reduced their operational independence. This may result
in chief officers being less able to resist demands to encroach on civil liberties, prioritize the needs of the powerful
over the marginalized, or to challenge policies that are likely to be ineffective or which neglect many peoples’ prior-
ities. This endangers effective police leadership and legitimacy. Suggestions are made for consideration by policy
makers, practitioners, and researchers to enhance police governance, leadership, and legitimacy. It is contended that
the findings have implications for governance, leadership, and legitimacy in other countries and sectors.
Introduction
This article uses empirical research (Shannon,
2018) to consider the implications for police legit-
imacy of how chief police officers are held to ac-
count and given political direction (their
governance) and the effect this has on them. It
argues that the mechanism and manner of police
governance is important because it influences
what chief officers do, and how they do it. In turn,
this article contends, chief officers affect what
more junior officers do and how they do it, and
what police officers do and how they do it largely
determines police effectiveness and legitimacy
(Loader, 2020). Although, how much influence
chief officers have over their staff is unclear, as
junior officers have considerable discretion about
how they act (Cockcroft, 2013, p. 20).
This article contributes to debates about police
legitimacy by using chief police officers’ accounts
of the effect of structures and processes of govern-
ance on them to examine the implications for le-
gitimacy arising from recent reforms to police
governance. Specifically, attention is paid to the
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impacts of reformed police governance on their
attitudes and experiences.
These accounts suggest that governance changes
introduced by the ‘Police Reform and Social
Responsibility Act 2011’ (PRSRA), particularly the
advent of Police and Crime Commissioners
(PCCs), increased chief officers’ anxieties, due to
the threats they perceived the reforms posed to
their job security, career progression, and oper-
ational autonomy. These anxieties may undermine
their confidence and make them hesitant to chal-
lenge priorities set for them that encroach on civil
liberties, or that fail to take account of widely held
expectations of police, or that result in less effect-
ive policing. These concerns may also cause chief
officers to feel fettered in exercising power to pro-
tect marginalized people. Altogether, it is argued,
this endangers police legitimacy.
The article starts by discussing legitimacy, its
construction, and chief officers’ contribution to it,
before assessing contemporary police governance.
The challenges governance poses for chief officers
and legitimacy are outlined, focusing on the power
that PCCs hold over chief constables. Then the
scrutiny of chief officers applied by other institu-
tions in the policing landscape is considered. Next,
the methods used for the research are addressed
and chief officers’ narratives about how they are
governed are explored and their concerns identi-
fied. Finally, the implications of governance
reforms for legitimacy are discussed and sugges-
tions made concerning governance and legitimacy
for consideration by policy makers, practitioners,
and researchers. Although this study was con-
ducted in England and Wales, it is contended that
the findings have implications for governance and
legitimacy in other countries.
Legitimacy
Policing is continually constructed and con-
strained by a quest for legitimacy (Bowling et al.,
2019, p. 65–98) and this research is framed by a
selective consideration of legitimacy literature.
Beetham (1991) proposed that legitimacy is a right
to exercise power that is broadly accepted and
underpinned by rules rooted in widely shared val-
ues and is claimed by all governments and their
institutions. These rules provide parameters for
the use of power and safeguards to minimize
its abuse (Beetham, 1991; Weber, 1922–23,
p. 294–296). Procedural justice theorists argue that
trust, founded on fair and respectful processes,
builds legitimacy and compliance (Hough and
Maffei, 2013). Legitimacy also requires distributive
justice and policing that supports marginalized
people, otherwise policing reproduces inequalities
(Reiner, 2007, p. 153). Police effectiveness also
enhances legitimacy (Goldsmith, 2005), as main-
taining order and protecting people justifies the
exercise of power (Hobbes, 1968 [1651]).
However, legitimacy is contested and viewed by
some as a concept constructed to sustain the status
quo (Habermas, 1976).
Leaders’ conduct is crucial in constructing legit-
imacy (Dyzenhaus, 2001) and chief police officers
have multiple audiences to persuade when doing
so (Peck and Dickinson, 2010). These include their
various publics, overseers, and junior police; the
latter need to be convinced to act in ways that fos-
ter legitimacy (Hoggett et al., 2019). Overall chief
officers can contribute to legitimacy by acting and
leading lawfully, fairly, and effectively and by pro-
tecting people, especially excluded groups in soci-
ety (Loader, 2020, p. 6). Not doing so, particularly
when serving partisan interests, undermines the
normative foundations of legitimacy, as it does
not reflect widely shared values about fairness, lib-
erty, and protection (Beetham, 1991). But chief
officers’ contribution to legitimacy is contingent
on their governance.
Contemporary police governance
This article addresses how chief police officers are
overseen and directed now, but context is required
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to explain why governance was changed by the
PRSRA. After the ‘Police Act 1964’ an accrual of
legislation, government guidance and performance
regimes eroded the influence of police authorities.
Notable among these changes was the
Conservative Government’s ‘Police and
Magistrates Court Act, 1994’. This Act strength-
ened the Home Secretary’s position in the tri-
partite governance arrangements by setting na-
tional objectives, weakened local government in-
fluence by introducing lay members to police
authorities (McLaughlin, 2007, p. 183–184) and
increased the autonomy of chief constables
(Loveday, 2018, p. 29).
The operational independence of chief consta-
bles, intended to promote legitimacy by protecting
police from ‘improper political interference’
(Policing Protocol Order, Home Office, 2011,
p. 12), was critiqued as preventing proper scrutiny
(Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984; Simey, 1988;
Patten, 1999; Savage et al., 2000). Concerns were
raised that police authorities failed to hold chief
officers to account during the Miners’ Strike of
1984–85, and that the Government was increasing-
ly controlling the police (Loader and Mulcahy,
2001, p. 258–259). The failure of the South
Yorkshire Police Authority to effectively scrutinize
the ‘exercise in misinformation and disinforma-
tion which was initiated and overseen by the chief
constable’, following the Hillsborough disaster in
1989 increased demands to reform police govern-
ance (Hillsborough Independent Panel, 2012;
Loveday, 2018, p. 32). The centralizing tendency
of national government continued under New
Labour (Golding and Savage, 2008) reducing the
influence of local governance and the autonomy of
chief officers, through mechanisms such as the
Police Performance Assessment Framework
(Caless, 2011, p. 148).
Concerns about the ineffectiveness of police
authorities in controlling chief constables, coupled
with the Conservative Party’s commitment to lo-
calism, led to the Coalition Government introduc-
ing the PRSRA, which shifted power towards local
governance (Lister, 2014, p. 23). Yet, the Home
Secretary retains influence, particularly by steering
institutions of national governance (Jones and
Lister, 2019) and by intervening in forces per-
ceived to be under-performing.1
Foremost among the PRSRA reforms was the
election of PCCs in 2012. PCCs hold chief consta-
bles to account, set their budgets, renew, or end
chiefs’ contracts and set their priorities through
local police and crime plans. Crucially, Section 38
gives PCCs the power to recruit and remove chief
constables. These reforms deliberately weakened
the autonomy of chief constables and were envis-
aged, by the Government, as democratizing polic-
ing (Cooper, 2020). However, by diminishing the
operational independence of chief officers, these
arrangements risk partisan influence being exerted
over them, which could damage legitimacy.
Limited checks on PCCs’ powers are provided
by Police and Crime Panels (PCPs), consisting of
local councillors and some independent members.
Lister (2014), Bailey (2015, 2017), and Loveday
(2018) argued that the scrutiny of PCCs provided
by PCPs is ineffective, as they lack adequate
powers and resources and, ironically, this creates
an accountability deficit for PCCs. PCPs’ powers
include seeking advice from Her Majesty’s
Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue
Services (HMICFRS2) if a PCC decides to remove
a chief constable. In the one case where such ad-
vice was given Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of
Constabulary (HMCIC), Sir Tom Winsor,
described the removal of David Crompton, the
Chief Constable (CC) of South Yorkshire, as
‘so unreasonable that I cannot understand how the
1 Now through a Home Office led Crime and Policing Performance Board (Patel, 2020).
2 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary was given an extended remit and became Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of
Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services in 2017. For simplicity, HMICFRS is used in this article other than for quota-
tions or citation of reports.
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PCC has reached this view’ (BBC, 2016). This did
not stop the removal, illustrating the limited cap-
acity of HMICFRS to moderate PCCs’ power over
chief constables. Although the consequent judge-
ment may increase the influence of HMCIC’s ad-
vice to PCCs in relation to the removal of chief
constables in the future (R v Police and Crime
Commissioner for South Yorkshire, 2017, para 333).
HMICFRS is legally independent of
Government and reports on the efficiency and ef-
fectiveness of police in England and Wales, but
its budget is determined by the Government and
its inspection programme approved by the Home
Secretary (HMICFRS, 2020a). The influence of
the Inspectorate over chief officer appointments
diminished following the PRSRA. Her Majesty’s
Inspectors (HMIs) no longer advise the Home
Secretary about shortlists for chief officer posts,
or guide PCCs about the merits of potential chief
constables, or mentor chief officers (HMICFRS,
2019a). Additionally, HMIs are, with one excep-
tion, no longer former chief constables.
HMICFRS has no power to inspect PCCs, argu-
ably an anomaly, as they set police priorities. The
need for oversight of PCCs may be greater than
for police authorities (which were inspected), as
power is vested in an individual, not a group
who can challenge each other. And the quality
and experience of some PCCs has been called
into question (Bailey, 2015, 2017; Loveday 2018,
p. 30).
Chief constables can resist PCCs’ power through
judicial review. R v Police and Crime Commissioner
for South Yorkshire, 2017, quashed the decisions
made by the PCC in relation to CC Crompton’s
removal. Muir (2017) and Loveday (2018) identi-
fied that this case is important. The judgement
illustrates the tensions in balancing democratic
oversight of chief constables and their operational
autonomy. It may diminish the operational inde-
pendence of chief constables and extend the
powers of PCCs over them, as it obliged PCCs to
hold chief constables to account for all aspects of
their performance (para 76); this may be the most
significant feature of this case for police govern-
ance (Loveday, 2018). Yet, a PCC should also
work with the CC ‘to maintain that independence’
(para 90). The judgement narrows the grounds for
removing chief constables to establishing whether
their actions are unreasonable (para 94); although
this does not offer the protection provided before
the PRSRA by Section 29 of the Police Act 1964,
which only permitted removal in the interests of
police efficiency (Cooper, 2020). The judgement
emphasizes that trust and goodwill between chief
constables and PCCs supports good governance
(para 73).
Judgements on PCCs’ use of power might be
provided by elections, but these have seen low
turnouts (Lister and Rowe, 2015), possibly casting
doubt on PCCs’ legitimacy, due to inadequate ‘evi-
dence of consent’ (Beetham, 1991, p. 16).
Governance introduced by the PRSRA added to
anxieties amongst chief officers, shortened tenures,
and reduced applications for chief officer posts
(National Police Chiefs’ Council [NPCC] 2018;
HMICFRS, 2019a4). The power of PCCs, and
elected mayors performing the role in some cities
(hereafter PCC indicates both), has contentiously
ended the careers of some high-profile chief offi-
cers5 (Reiner, 2016; Cooper, 2020). The power
placed in one person may also induce instability in
police leadership, leading to less effective policing
(Cooper, 2020). The controls on PCCs’ power ar-
guably do not satisfy Beetham’s (1991) and
Weber’s (1922–23, p. 294–296) requirements for
3 R (David Crompton) v Police and Crime Commissioner for South Yorkshire and Ors, (2017) EWHC 1349 (Admin).
4 The author declares an interest as leader of the team that conducted this inspection.
5 Examples include the retirement of Commissioner Sir Ian (now Lord) Blair in 2008, following pressure from Boris
Johnson, then Mayor of London (Caless, 2011, p. 237), and the lack of confidence shown in Chief Constable Sir Norman
Bettison by PCC candidates following the Hillsborough Inquiry, leading to his effectively enforced retirement in 2012
(Bettison, 2016; Conn, 2018).
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effective safeguards to prevent abuse of power and
protect legitimacy.
Other governance changes have occurred. Chief
officers have received greater scrutiny from
HMICFRS (2018, 2019a). Sir Tom Winsor is the
first Chief Inspector of Constabulary not to have
been a CC and he was previously a prominent crit-
ic of police pay and conditions of service (Winsor,
2011). The judgements of some inspections have
created tensions between HMICFRS, chief consta-
bles and PCCs; contentiously in Bedfordshire,
where the Chief and PCC complained about the
unfairness of the assessment (Hutber, 2017;
HMIC, 2016).
The Independent Office for Police Conduct
(IOPC, before 2018 the Independent Police
Complaints Commission [IPCC]6) has also in-
creasingly sought to hold chief officers to account
(Caless, 2011, p. 237). The IOPC is independent of
police and Government, although its budget is
determined by the Home Secretary; it oversees the
police complaints system, investigates serious
complaints, and has doubled in size since 2013
(IOPC, 2020). The quality and timeliness of IOPC
investigations has been criticized by PCCs, senior
police officers and HMICFRS, causing the Home
Affairs Select Committee (2020) to investigate its
role.
The College of Policing—which aims to prevent
crime, protect the public and secure public trust
by developing knowledge about what works in
policing, educating police and setting standards
(College of Policing, 2020)—commissioned re-
search into chief officers’ conduct (Hales et al.,
2015) and took over some functions from chief
officers, including setting national operational
guidelines. Mike Cunningham, Chief Executive of
the College, has identified that changes need to be
made to make it more relevant to police at all lev-
els (Smith, 2020).
This increased scrutiny by governing institu-
tions was apparently prompted by concerns, held
by some in governance, about the conduct of chief
officers.7 Chief officers’ accounts of this scrutiny
are now considered.
Chief police officers’ accounts of
governance
The empirical data used in this article were gath-
ered in semi-structured qualitative interviews con-
ducted in 2016 (Shannon, 2018) with nine chief
constables, three deputy chief constables, and four
assistant chief constables, including the equivalent
ranks in London (the rank designations applied
outside London are used for all). The officers
served in metropolitan, rural, and mixed forces. In
two forces, two officers of different ranks were
interviewed; in London, three officers of different
ranks participated. Four interviewees were females.
Chief constables are overrepresented but otherwise
the sample broadly reflects the demographic pro-
file of chief officers across England and Wales.
These interviews are used to examine key institu-
tions in the policing landscape.
The researcher’s approach unavoidably influ-
enced responses, and analysis of institutions
involved in police governance is inevitably select-
ive, as networks of governance are complex
(Crawford, 2006), and systems for formulating
6 The Independent Police Complaints Commission became the Independent Office for Police Conduct in 2018, with a
slightly extended remit and more resources. For simplicity IOPC is used in this article, other than for quotations or citation
of reports.
7 Examples of worrying conduct that may have provoked these concerns include the resignations in London of two assistant
commissioners, in 2007 and 2011, linked to their relationships with the press and poor judgement and leadership (Colbran,
2017), the dismissal of Chief Constable Price in 2012 (BBC, 2012), and imprisonment of Commander Dizae in 2013 (BBC,
2013): the latter two cases concerned abuse of power. The resignation of Chief Constable Gargan in 2015, following eight
proven instances of misconduct (Smith, 2017), raised further concerns. And worries persist about the behaviour of the for-
mer Chief Constable of South Yorkshire in the wake of the 1989 Hillsborough disaster (Hillsborough Independent Panel,
2012).
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policy are broad (Holdaway, 2017; Jones and
Lister, 2019). Analysis involved immersion in the
data, including recordings, transcripts, and hand-
written notes, followed by coding using QSR
NVivo (a qualitative data analysis tool) and subse-
quent refinement of coding, analysis, and
interpretation.
PCCs and others in governance positions are
likely to have different perspectives but it was
judged that they were not in scope for this study,
given the volume of data to be gathered and the
need to interview a range of chief officers. Hence,
the research is limited by its reliance on their nar-
ratives. However, other researchers (Reiner, 1991;
Wall, 1998) have demonstrated the value of critic-
ally considering police governance through chief
officers’ accounts.
The researcher is a former chief police officer
and inevitably knew many of the interviewees. The
risk of subjectivity was controlled by supportive
but challenging relationships with academic col-
leagues and reflexivity. Overall, the benefits of
being a former insider outweighed the disadvan-
tages, notably in gaining access and building
rapport.
The research found that chief officers held a pat-
tern of apprehensions about their governance by
institutions within the policing landscape.
However, they stressed the importance of govern-
ance in providing accountability and parameters
for the use of power. Examination of their appre-
hensions starts with PCCs and the Home Office,
before turning to HMICFRS, the IOPC, and
College of Policing.
The impact of PCCs on participants varied. A
few claimed to have good working relationships
with PCCs, involving considered challenge and
understandings of their respective roles. Others
said PCCs were unreasonably intrusive and tried
to direct how policing priorities should be pur-
sued. All contended that PCCs’ influence on them
was greater than the Home Secretary’s, largely be-
cause of PCCs’ power to recruit and remove chief
constables. A CC commented:
do I lose sleep over the Home
Secretary’s letters? No, I don’t. I am
more likely to lose sleep over [the
PCC] . . . Because ultimately, [the
PCC] can hire and fire me, the Home
Secretary can’t.
All suggested that an unhelpful aspect of the re-
lationship between CC and PCC was that it was
not mediated by different perspectives and because
power rested in one person:
There was actually better governance
and scrutiny under the Police
Authority than what there is under
the PCC . . . you had a balanced chal-
lenge because you had a balanced
group of people representing different
areas, different parties. (CC)
PCCs were seen by some participants as help-
ing justify the exercise of power, through a
democratic mandate and as an intermediary be-
tween police and their publics, and contended
that this democratic directive constrained and
guided them:
It would be totally wrong if the
[PCC’s] Police and Crime Plan then
had absolutely no impact whatever
on operational activity . . . that would
be . . . the chief constable obstructing
the local democratic will (CC).
But four raised concerns about the mandate,
due to low turnout at PCC elections, and most
suggested that engagement by PCCs with their
publics, particularly the marginalized, was inad-
equate. These reservations echo Loader’s (2002,
p. 137) warning that democratization of policing
threatens civil liberties and minorities, who may
be more policed than protected:
[The PCC] is there as a proxy for the
public but only about [XX] per cent
bothered to turn out and vote (CC).
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I don’t think [the PCC’s] consult-
ation tends to get near that [engage-
ment with marginalized people] . . .
we tend to consult with the great and
the good (CC).
Increased localism was an intended outcome of
the PRSRA, and PCCs have displaced the Home
Office as the institution of governance that chief
officers pay most attention to and are causing
them more concern than police authorities had.
Reduced Home Office influence was reflected in
this comment:
The big player is your Police and
Crime Commissioner, but interesting
isn’t it, because . . . Home Office
Circulars [government guidance]
were like the Bible (CC).
However, the Home Office continued to exert
influence over participants, though pressure was
often distanced and applied through HMICFRS.
This raised their anxieties about the potential for
the Home Office to exercise power over them,
while evading responsibility and blaming others,
by claiming that accountability for policing fail-
ures lay with PCCs and chief constables, echoing a
point made by Jones and Lister (2019):
[The Home Office] exert that [influ-
ence] through the HMIC. So, they
have created this façade of ‘it’s all
local and we’re giving it to PCCs’ but
actually we’ve created such rigid na-
tional standards that . . . you could
argue that’s a national policing plan
that we all have to adhere to, other-
wise we get . . . publicly ridiculed
(CC).
there was [before the PRSRA] a bit
more accountability flowing the
Home Office’s way . . . [The Home
Office] ought to commit to that pos-
ition and not just say it is down to
chief constables or PCCs - who it will
be easy to blame if things don’t go
well (CC).
Participants reported that HMICFRS influ-
enced them, half claimed it was used by the
Home Secretary to exert pressure on them
and 12 resented significant aspects of
Inspectorate oversight. The connecting theme
was that HMICFRS made them anxious and
added little to the quality of policing.
Concerns about its independence and resources
were evident:
I don’t see them (HMIC) as inde-
pendent; I see them as being driven
very much by the Home Secretary
(ACC).
[The Home Secretary exerts influ-
ence] partly through the Inspectorate
. . . [they] have got more resources
now than they ever had so do more
inspections, spend more time with us
. . . it is not uncommon for—for
there to be a missive arrive from the
Home Secretary following an inspec-
tion (CC).
[HMIC] are meant to be the fierce
advocates of the public. I don’t really
see any connection between what
they do and the public (CC).
The relationship between HMICFRS and chief
officers appeared to have deteriorated since 2011
and this added to their anxieties about governance.
The relationship with the IOPC seemed worse,
participants’ common view being that the IOPC
was ineffective, and its motivations were
questioned:
The quality of their investigations are
poor, the quality of their investigators
are poor, I—I don’t get it at all (CC).
[The IOPC are] making announce-
ments . . . which are more about
establishing their credentials than ac-
tually about, is this the best way to






/policing/advance-article/doi/10.1093/police/paaa088/6008003 by guest on 13 April 2021
be dealing with the circumstance?
(CC)
The IOPC increased chief officers’ worries about
the fairness and competence of their oversight.
They reported that the College of Policing caused
less anxiety, but its role seemed peripheral to 14 of
the 16 participants, and its relevance was
questioned:
[The College] do their Authorized
Professional Practice . . . they’re
endorsing the national guidance that
used to be endorsed by Chief
Constables’ Council. They’re not cen-
tral to my thinking at all (ACC).
The College of Policing seemed to have little in-
fluence over chief officers, but its impact on their
anxieties was limited. The College was a product
of the 2011 reforms, which also modified the ap-




Operational independence and the benefits it may
provide in building legitimacy by protecting police
from improper political interference (Royal
Commission on the Police, 1962) remains, as dis-
cussed earlier, contested (Jefferson and Grimshaw,
1984; Simey, 1988; Patten, 1999; Savage et al.,
2000). The ‘Policing Protocol Order’ (Home
Office, 2011) required by the PRSRA, guides rela-
tionships between chief constables, PCCs, PCPs,
and the Home Office. It envisages operational in-
dependence as PCCs setting the ‘what’ and chief
constables deciding ‘how’ (Lister, 2013), and
describes operational independence as context
driven. However, it is not clearly defined. This was
evident in participants’ accounts of operational in-
dependence as indistinct, and diminished since
2011:
The Policing Protocol means different
things to whoever reads it . . . it
makes it very clear that operational
independence is chief constables’ op-
erational independence. It also makes
[it] very clear that if somebody else
[a PCC] doesn’t like them [a CC],
they can fire them. So, consequently
. . . operational independence can be
fettered by the very nature that the
Policing Protocol is written (CC).
Budgets set by PCCs, within parameters permit-
ted by the Government (Jones and Lister, 2019)
limit what chief officers can do. Participants
reported that budgets are often tied to operational
structures and processes preferred by PCCs,
undermining the claim that chief constables decide
‘how’:
You can’t be operationally independ-
ent without any money. So, there has
. . . to be some form of negotiation
[with the PCC] (ACC).
PCCs’ power to recruit or remove chief consta-
bles caused participants’ greatest anxieties and
appeared to impinge on operational independence
and have a chilling effect on the will of chief con-
stables, and aspiring deputy and assistant chiefs, to
challenge PCCs, echoing concerns voiced by
Cooper (2020) and the Independent Police
Commission (2013):
it’s really hard saying to the person
with the headline ‘I’m going to hire
and fire you’: ‘Back off, I’m not going
to do it’. . . . you get all of these elec-
tion manifestos—‘I’m going to put
100 extra police officers on the neigh-
bourhood streets.’ . . . that is an oper-
ational decision. But quite a brave
chief to push back (CC).
Chief officers were anxious about the dimin-
ution of their operational autonomy, arising from
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the roles and responsibilities of PCCs but also
from interventions by other governing institutions
in the policing landscape and the threat this posed
to their career prospects. This risks them lacking
the confidence to challenge those in governance,
who might steer them towards directing policing
that neglects civil liberties; a risk posed by the
democratization of policing (Loader, 2002). It may
also discourage them from resisting policies and
operational mechanisms that are not evidence-
based, which could undermine effectiveness and
legitimacy (Goldsmith, 2005).
Illiberal direction and disregard of evidence-
based policy by PCCs and Government is, argu-
ably, rare. However, some mavericks have become
PCCs (Bailey, 2015, 2017). The first PCC for
Surrey used Facebook to say of a criminal ‘I
wanted to break his legs’ (BBC, 2016a) and his em-
phasis on intolerant enforcement (Hurley, 2012)
does not seem to be evidence-based. The current
PCC called for unauthorized traveller encamp-
ments to be criminalized (Office of the Police and
Crime Commissioner in Surrey, 2020), a policy
that would probably be detrimental to minorities
and distributive justice. The Home Secretary’s
demands for ‘a clampdown on Black Lives Matter
protests’ (Hamilton, 2020) also, debatably, illus-
trates the risk of delegitimating political interven-
tions in policing. These examples arguably
illustrate the need for operational independence,
balanced by democratic oversight, to protect liber-
ties, and effective and legitimate policing.
Chief officers’ concerns about
career security and progression
Participants claimed PCCs pose the greatest risk to
their jobs and professional prospects, but other
institutions were also said to raise anxieties.
Increased HMICFRS and IOPC activity were re-
peatedly raised, and there was nostalgia for a
Home Office that participants perceived had
engaged meaningfully with them, reminiscent of
Loader’s (2006) account of a collaborative crim-
inal justice elite:
HMIC has doubled. IPCC has
doubled. Home Office has become
more distant. And then crime com-
missioners are now political. So, all
of that has created added tensions
. . .I’ve had more complaints about
me in the last year than I’ve had in
[the rest of the participant’s career]
. . . it takes its toll (CC).
A common theme was the intensity of scrutiny
and the threat this posed to their job security and
career progression, leading to risk aversion:
One of my huge issues and concerns
in policing . . . is the “heads must
roll” mentality . . . It stifles people
from being allowed to take propor-
tionate risk and creates a sense of
fear (CC).
Participants attributed many of these anxi-
eties to PCCs’ power to recruit and remove
chief constables and to influence the career
progression of all chief officers. They inferred
that consequently their impartiality might be
compromised.8
The potential that chiefs become
wedded to the commissioners and
you get a more, almost American-
style system where a mayor is booted
out of office and then a chief goes as
well . . . that starts to politicize the
police by osmosis (CC).
Any chief constable that stands up
to a PCC and says: “wind your neck
in, this is operational policing” is im-
mediately vulnerable because they can
8 Wall (1998, p. 300) identified that 19th century chief constables tended to be selected due to their loyalty to local power
elites; the 2011 reforms may risk this recurring.
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be hired and fired by that PCC
(ACC).
These anxieties were partly based on awareness
of colleagues leaving policing prematurely. The
average term for a CC has fallen by 1.2 years since
the mid-1980s (NPCC, 2018, p. 34). HMICFRS
(2019a, p. 60) described the trend, which was
accelerated by the PRSRA, as ‘marked and
worrying’.
Deputy and assistant chiefs do not face the dir-
ect threat of removal from office by PCCs, but
they worried about PCCs’ influence on their
careers. They no longer have the potential protec-
tion from chief constables provided by police
authorities (which appointed and removed them;
this now rests with chief constables), and their car-
eer prospects can be contingent on the view of the
CC and PCC. Deputies seeking to be chiefs may be
particularly exposed:
possibly the most vulnerable beast in
policing today is the deputy chief
constable aspiring to be the chief
(CC).
you aren’t going to particularly
challenge somebody when they are
going to select you are you (DCC).
I’ve always felt that deputies and
ACCs were more vulnerable [than
CCs], knowing some of the chiefs
I’ve met . . . if a chief is under threat
what happens next? (CC)
Chief officers are no longer supported and
mentored by HMIs. Institutional and profes-
sional distance between inspector and
inspected may have benefits; nonetheless, this
remoteness increased many participants’ sense
of isolation:
HMIC was, I think, very much sup-
portive and [had an] advisory role;
and to become adversarial—I’m not
100% sure has been, actually, such a
good move, because quite often
forces who might be underperforming
have suddenly felt very, very vulner-
able . . . it becomes a really, really
dark place for some people (ACC).
Some participants identified the IOPC as a
source of anxiety and consequent risk aversion:
something like 20 per cent of all chief
officers . . . are subject to some sort
of enquiry by the IPCC . . . it makes
some people very risk averse—can
paralyse organizations or individuals
(DCC).
Many participants suggested these anxieties
made them less likely to use power, particularly to
challenge their overseers, or in circumstances
which might provoke scrutiny. They felt vulner-
able due to their perceptions of threats to their
careers posed by unreasonable scrutiny from the
IOPC, HMICFRS, and PCCs, by the apparent
withdrawal of Inspectorate support, and the risk of
being blamed by the Home Office. Their foremost
worry was what they saw as the danger to their
careers posed by PCCs. These apprehensions could
be debilitating:
When it comes to power, there’s
something about protecting that of-
fice [of chief constable]. The less
often that office wields power, the
safer it is because every time you
wield your power, you make yourself
vulnerable to challenge (CC).
These quotations do not adequately capture the
angst that emerged, in the tone and context of the
interviews but they reveal some of this anguish:
I had a tortuous first year . . . it cer-
tainly feels a lonely place. . . . the per-
formance indicators don’t look good
and people are getting worried and
the perfect storm because everyone is
on your case, there is a real
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temptation to doubt your own per-
sonal judgement (CC).
[I have] been a chief since XXXX.
It feels like 400 years . . . you’re mak-
ing different—different, kind of, calls
on the power you have got because
of some of that pressure to be seen to
be accountable . . . I’d be lying if I
said it doesn’t affect you (CC).
Chief officers reported that governance changes
introduced in 2011 led to disproportionate scru-
tiny, which exacerbated their anxieties. The impli-
cations of this for police legitimacy are discussed
next.
Discussion
Chief officers’ power does not stop them feeling
anxious and they can be exposed to pressures that
those who are less visible do not experience.9
Vulnerability is particularly disempowering if the
‘individual does not self-identify as vulnerable’
(Dehaghani, 2019, p. 40) and chief officers may be
reluctant to do so. Their anxieties seemed to in-
crease considerably following the 2011 reforms,
due to concerns about their governance, oper-
ational autonomy, career prospects, and job secur-
ity. Worryingly their goodwill towards and trust of
PCCs, that should support good governance (R v
Police and Crime Commissioner for South Yorkshire,
2017, para. 73) appeared fragile. Chief officers’
anxieties can diminish their confidence to use
power to protect people and to question priorities
that may not reflect wider societal values. This
may impede them in providing procedurally fair
(Hough and Maffei, 2013) and effective policing
(Goldsmith, 2005) and distributive justice that
protects excluded people (Reiner, 2007). This po-
tentially leads to withdrawals of consent to police
use of power, particularly by marginalized people,
and to a legitimacy crisis (Habermas, 1976;
Beetham, 1991).
These threats to legitimacy may seem remote
but the potential for authoritarian and partisan
agendas being imposed on police was a concern of
the Royal Commission on the Police (1962) and
informed the governance and operational inde-
pendence that followed, until reformed in 2011.
Chief officers debatably have a normative duty to
resist such agendas. Authoritarian threats to legit-
imacy may be rare in England and Wales but they
remain, and are arguably illuminated by some-
times overzealous, inconsistent, and unlawful use
of new police powers during the Coronavirus 19
pandemic (Smith, 2020a; The Times, 2020; Karim,
2020). This may exacerbate inequalities and threat-
en liberties (Parris, 2020), and lead to a disjunc-
tion between the values of the powerful and their
subordinates, which endangers legitimacy
(Beetham, 1991).
Chief officers’ anxieties may also make them re-
luctant to challenge PCCs when they set priorities
which fail to consider the expectations of many
people or are likely to be ineffective. Examples in-
clude prioritizing protecting the vulnerable, which
seem laudable, but which, without adequate fund-
ing, displaces activities such as dealing with ac-
quisitive crime and local policing (Pratt, 2017;
Higgins, 2018). HMICFRS (2020) has identified
that many users of police services are experiencing
increasingly ineffective policing as these activities
decline, and ineffective policing diminishes legit-
imacy (Goldsmith, 2005).
A balance needs to be struck between democrat-
ic oversight of chief police officers and their oper-
ational independence. And individuals and
institutions responsible for directing and oversee-
ing chief officers also need to be held to account.
This article has not explored the accountability of
national Government, but oversight of, and checks
9 Arguably illustrated by the scrutiny experienced by Chief Constable, Sir Norman Bettison, who was forced to retire in
2012 due to allegations that he made misleading comments minimizing his role, as a chief inspector, following the
Hillsborough tragedy in 1989. He was subsequently charged with misconduct in a public office, but 6 years later the charges
were withdrawn (Bettison, 2016; Conn, 2018).
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on, PCCs’ powers over chief officers appear
deficient.
Conclusion
This article has shown how recently introduced
governance arrangements heightened chief police
officers’ anxieties about their job security, career
prospects, and operational autonomy. This may
sap their confidence, leading to them failing to re-
sist political directions that undermine civil liber-
ties or prioritize the needs of the powerful over
those of the marginalized. They may also fail to
challenge policies that lead to ineffective policing
or neglect the priorities of many people. This
endangers legitimacy. Nonetheless, checks on chief
officers’ power and performance remain import-
ant in ensuring that police are effective and legit-
imate (Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984). Therefore,
the following proposals are made to improve po-
lice governance, increase chief officers’ confidence
and effectiveness, and consequently enhance police
legitimacy.
Firstly, the relationship between PCCs and chief
constables seems unduly weighted towards PCCs
(Cooper, 2020). This might be ameliorated by
making PCCs’ more accountable, by strengthening
the roles and responsibilities of HMICFRS and
PCPs in relation to PCCs’ governance of chief offi-
cers. Arguably the roles of PCPs should be clari-
fied, and their powers and resources extended
(Lister, 2014; Bailey, 2015, 2017; Loveday, 2018),
and the remit of HMICFRS expanded to include
inspecting PCCs.
Secondly, deputy and assistant chiefs’ concerns
about their oversight and direction by institutions
in the policing landscape include the impact that
chief constables and PCCs have on their career tra-
jectories. This issue needs further consideration by
researchers, practitioners, and policy makers.
Finally, decisions about policing priorities are
inevitably political (Loader, 2020, p. 8), but chief
officers need protection against improper partisan
influence. Consequently, the indistinct concept of
operational independence and its application
should be revisited by researchers, practitioners,
and policy makers.
The preceding discussions have explored the
implications of oversight and political direction of
chief police officers for police legitimacy.
Consideration of the findings would inform delib-
erations about policies and practices intended to
improve police governance and legitimacy. The re-
cently announced review of PCCs (Home Office,
2020) may provide an opportunity for such
consideration.
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